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Jamming Sensor Networks:
Attack and Defense Strategies
Wenyuan Xu, Ke Ma, Wade Trappe, and Yanyong Zhang, Rutgers University
Abstract
Wireless sensor networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for
adversaries to conduct radio interference, or jamming, attacks that effectively cause
a denial of service of either transmission or reception functionalities. These attacks
can easily be accomplished by an adversary by either bypassing MAC-layer protocols or emitting a radio signal targeted at jamming a particular channel. In this
article we survey different jamming attacks that may be employed against a sensor
network. In order to cope with the problem of jamming, we discuss a two-phase
strategy involving the diagnosis of the attack, followed by a suitable defense strategy. We highlight the challenges associated with detecting jamming. To cope with
jamming, we propose two different but complementary approaches. One approach
is to simply retreat from the interferer, which may be accomplished by either spectral evasion (channel surfing) or spatial evasion (spatial retreats). The second
approach aims to compete more actively with the interferer by adjusting resources,
such as power levels and communication coding, to achieve communication in the
presence of the jammer.

S

ecuring sensor networks is a challenging task due to
the limited resources associated with low-cost sensor
hardware. The combination of the commodity
nature of wireless technologies and an increasingly
sophisticated user base means that adversaries are able to easily gain access to communications between sensor devices by
purchasing their own device and running it in a monitor
mode. Conventional cryptographic security mechanisms are
being translated to the sensor domain in order to defend
against attacks like packet injection and spoofing networklevel control information. However, in spite of the progress
being made to apply network security in the sensor realm,
sensor networks will remain vulnerable to attacks that target
their use of the wireless medium.
The wireless medium allows for radio interference attacks
that target communications. Unlike traditional denial of service attacks, which are concerned with filling user domain
and kernel domain buffers, jamming attacks exploit the
shared nature of the wireless medium in order to prevent
devices from communicating or receiving. Such attacks on
the physical (PHY) layer have been known by the communications and radar community for some time, and there are
numerous texts, such as [1, 2], which discuss the issues associated with these attacks. Typically, in the context of traditional communication systems, the objective of the jammer is
to deny the reception of communications at the receiver
using as little power as possible. In these systems jamming is
usually addressed through spreading techniques, whereby
resilience to interference is achieved by transmitting information using a bandwidth much larger than its required minimum bandwidth. Often, this spreading is also used to
achieve multiple access, as in code-division multiple access
(CDMA) cellular systems.
With the exception of some military systems, most com-
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modity sensor and wireless networks do not employ sufficiently strong spreading techniques to survive jamming or
to achieve multiple access. Instead, for reasons of cost, systems like the Berkeley MICA2, the Zigbee (e.g., MICAZ),
and even 802.11 are based on a carrier sensing approach to
multiple access. Because of their use of carrier sensing for
medium access control (MAC), these systems are susceptible to a simple and severe jamming problem: an adversary
can simply disregard the medium access protocol and continually transmit on a wireless channel. By doing so, he or
she either prevents users from being able to commence
with legitimate MAC operations, or introduces packet collisions that force repeated backoffs, or even jams transmissions. Such MAC and PHY layer security threats for
wireless networks have been revisited recently by the Australian CERT [3], and will be a critical vulnerability for
wireless sensor networks.
In this article we survey issues related to jamming sensor
networks by examining both the attack and defend sides of
the problem. We present different jamming attack strategies
that might be used against sensor networks. Later, we examine methods that can be employed by the sensor network in
order to detect the presence of jamming. We illustrate that
basic statistics alone (e.g., signal strength) are not sufficient
for classifying the presence of a jammer, and more advanced
detection methods are needed. We examine two strategies for
coping with jamming. The first strategy involves avoiding the
jammer in either the spectral or spatial sense, and can be
achieved by changing channel allocations or, in mobile sensor
networks, by moving nodes away from the jammer. The second strategy involves competing with the jammer by adjusting
the transmission power levels and employing error correction
in order to have more resilience against jamming. Finally, we
present concluding remarks.

0890-8044/06/$20.00 © 2006 IEEE
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irrespective of the traffic pattern on the channel.
Active jammers are usually effective because
they keep the channel busy all the time. As we
shall see in the following section, these methods
are relatively easy to detect. An alternative
approach to jamming wireless communication is
!@#$%$#@#%^&*!@<>?”:@$!@#$%$#@#%^&*!@<>?”:@$
to employ a reactive strategy. The reactive jamConstant jammer:
mer stays quiet when the channel is idle, but
Continually emits a radio signal
starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it
CRC Prevent legitimate nodes from getting hold of channel
Preamble
senses activity on the channel. One advantage of
a reactive jammer is that it is harder to detect.
Payload
Payload
Payload
Payload
Payload
...
In our work [4] we implemented the above
Deceptive jammer:
four jammer models using Berkeley Motes that
Constantly injects regular packets to the channel without any gap
between packets
employ a ChipCon CC1000 RF transceiver and
A normal communicator will be deceived into the receive state
use TinyOS as the operating system. We
&F*(SDJF
^F&*D(
D*KC*I^
...
bypassed the MAC protocol, so the jammer can
Random jammer:
blast on the channel irrespective of other activiAlternates between sleeping and jamming
ties taking place. We observed that the level of
Good for jammers that do not have unlimited power supply
interference a jammer causes is governed by sevUnderlying
Payload
Payload
Payload
normal
eral factors, such as the distance between the
traffic
&F*(SDJ
^%^*&
CD*(&FG . . .
jammer and a normal wireless node, the relative
transmission power of the jammer and normal
Reactive jammer:
Quiet when the channel is idle, transmits when it senses channel activity
nodes, and the MAC protocol employed by norTargets the reception of a message and harder to detect
mal nodes. The MAC protocol decides whether
the channel is idle if the measured signal
■ Figure 1. Jamming attacks target a sensor’s ability to transmit or receive packstrength value is lower than a threshold. Many
ets. Different jamming models accomplish the objective of blocking communiMAC protocols, such as the one in TinyOS
cations through different strategies.
release 1.1.1, use a fixed threshold value, while
others, such as BMAC [8], adapt the threshold
value based on the measured signal strength values
when
a
channel
is idle. As a result, these two different
Jamming Attacks
categories of MAC protocols decide the channel is jammed
differently. We briefly summarize the results of our experiThere are many different attack strategies an adversary can
ments. We had three parties, A, B, and X, where A and B are
use to jam wireless communications [4–6], as depicted in Fig.
normal wireless nodes with A being the sender, B the receiv1. While it is impractical to cover all the possible attack moder, and X is a jammer using one of our four models. More
els that might exist, in this article we review a wide range of
details of the experimental setup can be found in [4].
jammers that have proven to be effective.
A jammer can interfere with normal communications
Constant jammer: The constant jammer continually emits a
between two legitimate communicators in two ways: preventing
radio signal, and can be implemented using either a waveform
the sender from sending out packets, or preventing the receivgenerator that continuously sends a radio signal [7] or a norer from receiving packets. Hence, we use the resulting packet
mal wireless device that continuously sends out random bits to
send ratio (PSR) and packet delivery ratio (PDR) to measure
the channel without following any MAC-layer etiquette [4].
the effectiveness of a jammer. Our experiments showed that all
Normally, the underlying MAC protocol allows legitimate
four jammers are quite effective in interfering with normal
nodes to send out packets only if the channel is idle. Thus, a
communications. The constant jammer can successfully preconstant jammer can effectively prevent legitimate traffic
vent a node from sending out packets if that node employs a
sources from getting hold of a channel and sending packets.
MAC protocol with a fixed threshold. Irrespective of the MAC
Deceptive jammer: Instead of sending out random bits, the
protocol, the PDR is very poor, because the packets that mandeceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets to the
age to get sent out (e.g., where BMAC is employed) are corchannel without any gap between subsequent packet transmisrupted anyway. The deceptive jammer, on the other hand, can
sions. As a result, a normal communicator will be deceived into
completely block the send operations in any case because the
believing there is a legitimate packet and be duped to remain in
sender will be forced to stay in receive mode all the time. The
the receive state. For example, in TinyOS, if a preamble is
random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming.
detected, a node remains in the receive mode, regardless of
While sleeping, the network operations will be normal; while
whether that node has a packet to send or not. Even if a node
jamming, it behaves just like a constant or deceptive jammer,
has packets to send, it cannot switch to the send state because a
depending on in which mode it operates. Finally, the reactive
constant stream of incoming packets will be detected.
jammer does not affect the send ratio, but all the packets are
Random jammer: Instead of continuously sending out a
corrupted, resulting in a zero PDR.
radio signal, a random jammer alternates between sleeping
and jamming. Specifically, after jamming for a while, it turns
off its radio and enters a “sleeping” mode. It will resume jamming after sleeping for some time. During its jamming phase,
Detecting Jamming Attacks in Sensor
it can behave like either a constant jammer or a deceptive
Networks
jammer. This jammer model tries to take energy conservation
into consideration, which is especially important for those
Detecting jamming attacks is important because it is the first
jammers that do not have unlimited power supply.
step toward building a secure and dependable wireless network. Detecting radio interference attacks is challenging as it
Reactive jammer: The three models discussed above are
active jammers in the sense that they try to block the channel
involves discriminating between legitimate and adversarial causes
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■ Figure 2. RSSI readings as a function of time in different scenarios. RSSI values were sampled every 1 ms.

of poor connectivity. In particular, legitimate scenarios for
poor connectivity, such as congestion and device failures, may
be difficult to differentiate from jamming.
There are several statistics that naturally lend themselves to
detecting jamming, such as signal strength, carrier sensing
time, and packet delivery ration. We will look at these different measurements and discuss how they are not effective in
detecting a jamming attack. In order to repair the ability to
detect a jamming attack, more sophisticated methods are
needed, and we will discuss one possibility involving multimodal methods.

Basic Statistics
Signal Strength — One natural measurement that can be
employed to detect jamming is signal strength. The rationale
behind using this measurement is that the signal strength distribution may be affected by the presence of a jammer. Two
natural approaches to detecting jamming using signal strength
involve comparing average signal magnitude vs. a threshold
calculated from the ambient noise levels, and classifying the
shape of a window of signal samples.
In order to illustrate the effect a jammer would have on the
received signal strength, we present results of several experiments conducted with the MICA2 Mote platform in Fig. 2.
These experiments are described in more detail in [4]. In the
first two experiments we have two Motes, a sender A and a
receiver B, which are 30 in apart. The top two plots correspond to normal, or benign, traffic scenarios where the source
A transmits at a constant bit rate (CBR) of 5.28 kb/s, while
the second plot corresponds to A transmitting at its maximum
send rate, a raw traffic rate of 6.46 kb/s. The bottom four
plots correspond to four different jamming scenarios in which
we introduced a jammer. Throughout these four jamming scenarios, A is a CBR source. Looking at raw time series data, it
is clear that any statistic solely based on a moving average of
the RSSI values would be hard pressed to discriminate
between a normal traffic scenario and a reactive jammer scenario. Furthermore, the shape of the RSSI time series for normal traffic scenarios and the reactive jammer are too similar
to rely on spectral discrimination techniques for discrimination. Further analysis of these methods and the difficulties
associated with using signal strength readings may be found in
[4]. Overall, these results suggest the following important
observation: we may not be able to use simple statistics, such
as average signal strength or energy, to discriminate jamming
scenarios from normal traffic scenarios because it is not
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straightforward to devise a threshold that can separate these
two scenarios.
Carrier Sensing Time — A jammer can prevent a legitimate
source from sending out packets because the channel might
appear constantly busy to the source, and hence it might seem
possible to use carrier sensing time as a means to determine
whether a device is jammed. In [4] the authors explored this
possibility. We observed that using carrier sensing time is suitable when the following two conditions are true: the jammer
is non-reactive or non-random, and the underlying MAC protocol determines whether a channel is idle by comparing the
noise level with a fixed threshold. If these two conditions are
true, carrier sensing time is an efficient way to discriminate a
jammed scenario from a normal ill-functioning scenario, such
as congestion, because the sensing time will be bounded,
although large, in a congested situation, but unbounded in a
jammed situation. Overall, carrier sensing time alone cannot
be used to detect all the jamming scenarios.
Packet Delivery Ratio — Similarly, PDR may be used to detect
the presence of jamming, as the jammer can effectively corrupt transmissions, leading to a much lower PDR. Since a
jamming attack will degrade the channel quality surrounding a
node, the detection of a radio interference attack essentially
boils down to determining whether the communication node
can send or receive packets in the way it should have had the
jammer not been present. More formally, let us consider the
PDR between a sender and a receiver who are within radio
range of each other, assuming that the network only contains
these two nodes and that they are static. As noted earlier, an
effective jammer results in a very poor PDR, close to 0, which
indicates that PDR may be a good candidate in detecting jamming attacks. We would like to point out that a nonaggressive
jammer, which only marginally affects the PDR, does not
cause noticeable damage to network quality and does not
need to be detected or defended against.
Next, we need to investigate how much PDR degradation
can be caused by non-jamming normal network dynamics,
such as congestion or failures at the sender side. Our studies
in [4] showed that even in a highly congested situation where
a raw traffic rate of 19.38 kb/s is offered to MICA2 radio
whose maximum bandwidth capacity is 12.364 kb/s at a 100
percent duty cycle, the PDR measured by the receiver is still
around 78 percent. As a result, a simple thresholding mechanism based on the PDR value can be used to differentiate a
jamming attack, regardless of the jamming model, from a congested network condition. Although PDR is quite effective in
discriminating jamming from congestion, it is not as effective
for other network dynamics, such as a sender battery failure,
or a sender moving out of a receiver’s communication range,
because these dynamics can result in sudden PDR drop in
much the same way as a jammer does. Specifically, if the
sender’s battery drains out, it stops sending packets, and the
corresponding PDR is 0 percent.
Consequently, compared to signal strength and carrier sensing time, PDR is a more powerful statistic in that it can be
used to differentiate a jamming attack from a congested network scenario for different jammer models. However, it still
cannot differentiate a jamming attack from other network
dynamics that can disrupt communication between a sender
and a receiver.

Advanced Detection Strategies
Rather than use such basic statistical methods, multimodal
strategies, such as combining PDR with signal strength readings, appear to be promising. In a normal scenario with no
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PDR vs. SS
-66

JAMMED messages, announcing the fact that they are
jammed. These JAMMED messages will not be able to be
received by other jammed neighbors. However, those neighbors on the boundary of the jammed region, but are not
themselves jammed themselves, will be able to hear the
JAMMED messages, though potentially at a higher error rate.
Once non-jammed sensors receive JAMMED messages, they
initiate the mapping procedure. These nonjammed nodes
exchange and merge information describing which nodes they
have witnessed as jammed, where those jammed sensors are
located, along with neighbor information. By continuing the
exchange of information regarding witnessed jammed nodes,
the network will eventually be able to map out the boundary
of a jammed area.
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■ Figure 3. (PDR, SS) measurements indicating the relationship
between PDR and signal strength, and the (PDR, SS) values for
different jammers. The shaded region is the jammed-region.

Evasion Defense Strategies
Security is a constant battle between the security expert and
the clever adversary; therefore, we have chosen to take inspiration for our work from Sun Tze’s famous The Art of War:
He who cannot defeat his enemy should retreat.

interference, a high signal strength corresponds to a high
PDR. However, if the signal strength is low (i.e., the strength
of the signal is comparable to noise levels), the PDR will also
be low. On the other hand, a low PDR does not necessarily
imply a low signal strength: it may be that all of a node’s
neighbors have died (perhaps from consuming battery
resources or device faults), or the node is jammed. The key
observation here is that in the first case, the signal strength is
low, which is consistent with a low PDR measurement, while
in the jammed case, the signal strength should be high, which
contradicts the fact that the PDR is low.
Using these observations, we defined a multimodal consistency check. During a guaranteed time of noninterfered network operation, a table (PDR, SS) of typical packet delivery
ratios and signal strength values are measured. From this
data, one can calculate an upper bound for the maximum SS
that would have produced a particular PDR value in a nonjammed scenario. Using this bound, the (PDR, SS) plane is
partitioned into a benign region and a jammed region. To
illustrate how such a detection scheme might operate, we present the results of our investigation, which was conducted
using MICA2 Motes, in Fig. 3. We varied source-receiver separation for four different jammers. The PDR and SS readings
were averaged over a sufficient time window to remove
anomalous fluctuations (e.g. hardware-related or fading-related variations). We found the 99 percent SS confidence levels
for different regions, and defined the jammed-region to be the
region of (PDR, SS) that is above the 99 percent signal
strength confidence intervals and whose PDR values are less
than 65 percent. As can be seen in Fig. 3, the (PDR, SS) values for all jammers distinctly fall within the jammed region,
suggesting that classification is feasible.

Mapping Jammed Areas
Following the detection of whether a node is jammed, it is
desirable for the network to map out regions of the sensor
network that are jammed. By having a map of jammed areas,
network services can use this knowledge to influence routing,
power management, and higher-layer planning. A protocol for
mapping out the jammed regions of a sensor network was presented in [9]. In this article jamming detection is performed
by monitoring channel utilization. Once the sensors observe
that their channel utility is below a preset threshold, they conclude that they are jammed. Following detection, the jammed
nodes bypass their MAC-layer temporarily and broadcast
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Translating this philosophy into the wireless domain, two
strategies were recently proposed in [7] in order to defend
against jamming attacks: channel surfing and spatial retreats.
The underlying idea behind each strategy is to evade the
interferer, in either the spectral or physical sense.

Channel Surfing
Channel surfing is motivated by frequency hopping modulation. Unlike frequency hopping, which is a PHY layer modulation method involving continual changing of the carrier
frequency, the changing of frequencies in channel surfing is
on demand and operates at the link layer. Let us examine a
simple two-party communication scenario, as depicted in Fig.
4a, where adversary X 1 or X 2 has disrupted communication
between A and B. In channel surfing, both A and B change
their channel assignment to a new channel in order to avoid
X’s interference. Changing channels in the two-party scenario is fairly straightforward. We have built a prototype
using the Berkeley MICA2 platform, in which A and B
detect whether they are jammed, switch to a new channel
(channel assignment is done using a pseudo-random generator), and re-establish connectivity when they detect each
other’s presence on the new channel [7]. Example results
depicting the PDR for the two-party channel surfing prototype are presented in Fig. 4b.
Extending the notion of channel surfing to more general
network scenarios, such as wireless LANs or ad hoc networks, is significantly more challenging. An initial outline of
such channel surfing strategies was presented in [7]. Implementing these basic strategies, however, is a very difficult task
as reliably coordinating multiple devices switching to new
channels faces the usual challenges of distributed computing:
asynchrony, latency, and scalability. To address these challenges, we propose the following channel surfing variations:
coordinated channel switching and spectral multiplexing, discussed below.
In a coordinated channel switch, the entire network changes
its channel to a new channel. In such a scheme, when a node
detects that it is jammed, it switches channels and sends beacons to announce its presence on the new channel. Boundary
nodes, which are not jammed but are neighbors of jammed
nodes, will detect the absence of their neighbors on the original channel and probe the next channel to see if their neighbors are still nearby. If a node detects beacons on the new
channel, it will switch back to the original channel and trans-
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■ Figure 4. a) Jammed two-party radio communication; b) PDR
measurements from channel surfing prototype.
mit a broadcast message informing the entire network to
switch to the new channel.
Performing a coordinated channel switch across an entire
network incurs significant latency as the scale of the network
increases; as a result, the network may be in an unstable
phase where some devices are on an old channel while others
are waiting on the new channel. To alleviate the latency problem, we can have only jammed regions switch channels, and
have nodes on the boundary of a jammed region serve as
relay nodes between different spectral zones.

Spatial Retreats
We now explore spatial retreats, in which jammed nodes try
to evacuate from jammed regions. Spatial retreats are suitable for mobile sensor networks. Merely escaping from a
jammed region is not sufficient, however, as a mobile adversary can move through the coverage area and cause large
swaths of the sensor network to relocate. By doing so, an
adversary can cause the network to become unevenly distributed, or even partitioned, thereby severing network communications.
Therefore, spatial retreat strategies should be robust to
mobile jammers. In order to achieve this robustness, a spatial
retreat strategy should have two phases:
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• Escape phase, in which the nodes located within the jammed
area move to “safe” regions, and stay connected with the
rest of the network
• Reconstruction phase, in which the mobile nodes move about
to achieve uniform network coverage, thereby preventing
the jammer from partitioning the network
Let us look at a robust escape strategy that has been developed. Suppose the network is connected before the jamming
attack; that is, every node within the jammed area is connected with nodes outside via one hop or multiple hops. In the
example shown in Fig. 5a, before the jamming attack, node A
was directly connected with A’, node B was directly connected
with B’, node D was directly connected with D’, and C was
connected with D’ via D. After the jamming attack is detected, the nodes within the jammed area choose a random direction to evacuate. While moving, each node continuously runs
the jamming detection algorithm until it leaves the jammed
area. As soon as it leaves the jammed area, it tests whether
there are some nodes within its radio range. If not, it moves
along the boundary of the jammed area until it reconnects to
the rest of the network. In Fig. 5a, if node A moves along the
boundary, it will eventually arrive at a location that is between
the location of A’ and the original location of A, where it can
reconnect to A’. The techniques that enable a node to move
along the boundary of the jammed area (Fig. 5b) are discussed in detail in [10].
If the jammer is mobile, its movement may cause the network to become severely unbalanced, or even partitioned. As
an example, in the two figures on the left in Fig. 6, we depict
an initial network configuration (the top picture on the left),
and then introduce a jammer that moves in the y-direction
through the middle of the network. The result is a network
that is severely partitioned (bottom left). In order to address
this problem, we propose to apply the techniques of virtual
forces and potential fields, which are popular methods for
governing motion in robotic systems, to continuously repair
the network topology, regardless of the jammer movement.
To use virtual forces, we need three types of forces: the forces
between the nodes, the force from the boundary of the region,
and the force from the boundary of the jammed area. In
order to define the boundary of the jammed region, one must
use a jammed area mapping technique, such as the one proposed in [9]. By carefully defining these forces and their interplays, we can continually repair the network topology as
presented in [10]. We now examine the behavior of our robust
spatial retreat strategy by looking at an experiment involving a
mobile jammer cutting across the network coverage area. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the mobile sensor network’s
topology as the jammer moves through the network, and the
robust spatial retreat algorithm not only evacuates the jammed
area but also repairs regions left empty by the mobile jammer.

Competition Strategies: Power Control and
Code Throttling
An alternative to performing evasion strategies, where the
sensor nodes try to evade the jammer in some sense, is to
have the sensors attempt to compete against the jammer. In
this case the objective should be for the sensors to improve
the reliability of the reception of their packets. This requires,
if a node detects it is jammed, that it will ignore the fact that
it is jammed, and transmit its packet anyway. In order for
nodes that are jammed, as well as nodes near jammed regions
(as mapped out using techniques proposed by [9]), to compete
against the jammer, they should adjust the coding and power
of their communications at the lower layers. By employing a
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stronger error correcting code with a
B‘
lower information rate, we reduce the
overall throughput but increase the likeliA‘
A‘
B
hood of packets successfully being decodA
A
A
ed. We may also increase the
B‘
transmission power employed by legitiC
mate radio devices in order to allow
reception to operate at higher signal-toD
noise ratios. This strategy involves a
return to looking at the problem using
D‘
D‘
traditional communications theory, as
well as methods employed by the electronic warfare community. However,
(b)
(a)
there are some key differences that suggest this direction of research will not fall
■ Figure 5. Escaping from the jammed area: a) The network topology when the jamming
out immediately from traditional commuattack occurs — the jammed area is highlighted by the shaded area; b) the dashed line
nications theory for anti-jamming, as
marks the trace through which node A escapes from the jammed area and reconnects
described in [1, 2]. In particular, since we
to the rest of the network.
are operating in a system employing carrier sensing, it should be realized that
using increased power levels introduces
involve looking at the viability of combining power control
new problems as radio devices will have a larger radio coverand code throttling in the presence of RF jamming.
age pattern, thereby increasing the likelihood of collisions and
unintentional interference with other legitimate radio devices.
Additionally, there are several systems-level issues that
Concluding Remarks
need to be addressed when employing these methods. For
example, the work of [11] provides a theoretical study into the
Due to the low-cost design of sensor nodes, and the ease with
use of low density parity check and Reed-Solomon codes to
which they may be reprogrammed, sensor networks will be
cope with jamming, but does not address critical systems intevery susceptible to intentional radio interference attacks. This
gration issues. Here, applying the ECC must be done in such
article has surveyed both the attack and defend side of jama way to protect the critical frame preamble and not just the
ming wireless sensor networks. Four different types of jampayload. Furthermore, it is necessary to develop protocols
ming devices, which involved bypassing MAC layer carrier
that adaptively throttle code rates based upon a perceived
sensing, have been discussed. We then turn to the problem of
threat level. In particular, the detection mechanisms described
detecting the presence of jamming, where we have illustrated
earlier should be modified in order to provide an estimate of
why simple statistics are not sufficient. Multimodal detection
the severity of a jamming threat. This parameter will serve as
methods have recently been proposed as a means to circuminput into a protocol that will adaptively adjust power and
vent this challenge. Following detection, it is desirable that
code rate. Taken together, these issues just outlined suggest
the network can repair itself. Toward this end, two evasion
that an important direction for future exploration would
strategies have been discussed: the first involving the sensor
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■ Figure 6. The two figures on the left illustrate that a mobile jammer can partition the network. The remaining figures depict the ability of
a robust spatial retreats algorithm to repair the effect of a jammer passing through the coverage region.
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network adapting its operating frequencies, the second suitable for mobile sensor networks and involving nodes relocating themselves. A different defense strategy involves sensors
trying to out-compete the jammer by employing error correcting codes and increasing the node transmission power. Both
evasion and competition strategies are at an early stage of
investigation by the community, and as these techniques
mature an important area for study will be understanding and
classifying the scenarios where one defense strategy is advantageous over another.
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